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I.

Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 is a complex and multifaceted process.
Its underlying causes shall be attributed to the prevalent excess liquidity or, using the Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke's term, to the 'savings glut' in global financial markets, as well as to the un-orderly proliferation of subprime mortgages in the United States, coupled with inadequate asset/liability and risk management practices of financial institutions. Its systemic complexity and far-reaching spillover effects into a wide-range of credit areas, global financial markets, commodity markets and real economy make this crisis seemingly more different and more multifarious than the previous financial crisis episodes.
Proliferation of this crisis can be explained in terms of changeable allocations of the global savings that have become increasingly illiquid 1 . As these allocations move across various asset types, they generate disorderly asset-price bubbles. We call this process a "wandering asset-price bubble". Accordingly, this crisis has gone through five distinctive stages. First, it began with the housing bubble in the U.S. that was increasingly inflated by subprime and near prime (so called Alt-A) mortgage lending 2 . Second, it spread into other types of assets and affected not only mortgage companies and specialized investment banks, but also universal banks. Third, it induced the global liquidity crisis accompanied by a massive pullout of liabilities from the most severely exposed banks, i.e. Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and, later, Lehman Brothers, triggering anxiety about possible credit contagion from counterparty risk on the global scale. Fourth, the collapse of structured investment products, mainly collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), shifted the global liquidity allocations into commodity futures market causing bubble effects in this area as well.
Fifth, it reached a zenith in September 2008 with massive shifts of funds into risk-free 1 The size of global savings is best captured by the total value of international managed assets companies (pension funds, mutual funds, insurance funds, official reserves, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds and private equity) estimated by the International Monetary Fund to have reached $76 trillion at the end of 2007. Total liquidity attributable to unregulated, more risk-prone sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds and private equity reached $9 trillion, the changeable allocations of which inflated various asset bubbles.
securities, as Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection and US investment banking system faced its ultimate demise.
The key factors contributing to the decline of the housing market and the subprime mortgage market in the U.S. are examined in Section II. The five distinctive stages of the crisis are identified in Section III. Possible theoretical explanations of the current crisis are discussed in Section IV. Interactions between different financial risk categories during the course of this crisis are analyzed in Section V. Policy recommendations at the micro-level, i.e. for financial institutions are presented in Section VI. They are followed by recommendations at the macro-level, i.e. for regulatory agencies and monetary authorities in Section VII, which also evaluates critically the actual actions of central banks aimed at containing the crisis and mitigating the resulting risks to global financial stability. A synthesis of main findings and arguments of the paper, as well as suggestions for further research are provided in Section VIII.
II. Origins of the Current Financial Crisis
The deep roots of the current crisis can be traced back to the capital outflows from many emerging markets in the aftermath of the 1997/98 Asian and Russian financial crises and the correspondent liquidity buildup in the countries with growing current account surpluses. Although such a far-sighted analysis would be reasonable, the aim of this study is to emphasize the more immediate and direct contributing factors and triggers of the current crisis.
This crisis has stemmed from an idiosyncratic combination of macroeconomic processes and micro-level institutional factors, all prevalent before the outbreak of the crisis in 2007. The macroeconomic contributors to the crisis include: monetary expansion in the U.S., large capital inflows to U.S. securities market (mainly government bond market) from high-savings countries, the U.S. housing boom and the mounting indebtedness of U.S. households. The institutional characteristics encompass: rapidly growing asset securitization coupled with financial innovations i.e. development of new structured financial products, the emergence of hedge funds as well as conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs); flawed credit risk assessment and asset valuation models; inadequate financial supervisory and regulatory frameworks.
The monetary expansion in the U.S. was based on the supposition that the unprecedented productivity growth of the late 1990s and early 2000s (induced by the technological progress) was not matched by wage and costs adjustments. It was, therefore, non-inflationary. The monetary expansion contributed to higher net interest margins for banks. The cost of funding for banks based on the federal funds rate was considerably below the thirty-year mortgage rate at that time (see Figure 3) . Experiencing a very low cost of funding during the bountiful liquidity period, financial institutions enjoyed high profit margins on mortgage loans, since the spread of mortgage rates over the fed funds rates was considerably wide (Figure 3 ). The cheap money and the housing boom encouraged banks to engage in more risky lending practices. The mortgage lending base now widened to include subprime borrowers and the lending tactics became more aggressive by offering either initial low interest rates (so called 'teaser rates') or payment options (option ARMs). On a wide-spread scale, the standard credit approval criteria based on maximum levels of total debt service (TDS) ratios for mortgage borrowers were either violated or ignored. The default risk was no longer a concern since mortgage originators had no intention of retaining the loans on their balance sheets. Hence, the unprecedented expansion of high-risk non-traditional mortgage loans took place. Higher volume of lending activities was supported by complex securitization of mortgages. The resulting collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 3 were sold providing funds for new loans, thus increasing banks' fee income (from origination fees). In the meantime, the share of subprime and Alt-A in total newly-originated securitized mortgages reached 40 percent in 2006 while it was merely 9 percent in 2001 (Tilton, 2007) . This rush to 3 In their abbreviated definition, CDOs are broad structured credit instruments derived from pools of underlying assets such as loans, corporate bonds, asset-backed securities or mortgage-backed securities. These assets are divided into tranches with varying credit risk: senior tranches (AAA-rated), mezzanine tranches (AA to BB-rated), and unrated equity tranches (also referred to as 'toxic waste').
In addition to involving fixed-income assets, CDOs can also be constructed on the basis of credit default swaps (synthetic CDOs) or on the basis of CDO tranche itself (CDOs-squared). Junior tranches offer higher interest rates to investor to compensate for higher credit risk.
high risk mortgage loans has been unprecedented, considering the fact that in 2006 subprime loans constituted merely 14 percent of total outstanding U.S. mortgages, near-prime only 6 percent while the traditional prime loans prevailed with the 80 percent share .
….. insert Figure 3 around here …..
Such surge in non-prime mortgage loans would not be possible if not for the ability of banks to transfer default risk to market investors who bought CDOs. These complex financial instruments were attractive to investors, because they offered higher rate of return than other marketable securities with similar credit ratings, particularly given the low interest rate environment. Their proliferation has been significant over the past several years, as shown in Consequently, the plentiful global liquidity in the hands of managed investment funds was re-allocated into high-yielding CDOs, which initially offered attractive returns.
However, these structured products entailed significant asymmetric information. For investors, the information asymmetry came in the form of the adverse selection problem, i.e. before their purchase, investors believed that CDOs carried a relatively low risk due to their narrow spreads over risk-free securities. In a one-year retrospect of the financial crisis, one may conclude that these spreads did not nearly compensate for the de facto high default and liquidity risks associated with these structured products stemming from the non-performance of their underlying assets, such as subprime mortgages. The de facto risks associated with these complex derivatives with option-like characteristics have been grossly underestimated by credit rating agencies.
Surge of mortgage originations to low-income borrowers in the environment of rising home prices contributed to higher debt burden of U.S. households. As shown in Figure 5 , the share of mortgage repayments in total household debt service 
III. Distinctive Stages of the Crisis
The macro-and microeconomic triggers of the subprime mortgage crisis along with the systemic flaws in risk assessment and management were clearly overlooked prior to the outset of the present financial crisis. With the Fed's return to the policy tightening cycle (see Figure 3) , interest rate spread of CDOs over government securities narrowed, gradually eroding attractiveness of these derivatives to global investors. At the same time, interest rates on adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) reset higher, leading to a dramatic increase in defaults and foreclosure activities. 9 Valuable insights on the current escalation in expected spot prices of crude oil are provided by Brown, Virmani and Alm (2008) . They attribute this increase to escalating demand expectations and to the U.S. dollar depreciation. In addition, Stevans and Sessions (2008) show empirically that the real price of oil today is strongly determined by long-term futures contracts that are inherently speculative.
Thus in retrospect, the five distinctive stages of the ongoing financial crisis can be identified: In such a fragile environment, assessing systemic risk and credit quality across many asset classes is fraught with difficulty for banks, credit rating agencies and investors. The asymmetric information and collective risks associated with various asset-backed securities have proven to be more significant than previously assumed. Regardless which asset classes are affected by the asset-price bubble, they are always subject to excessive volatility of their prices. It can be therefore argued that the episodes of surging capital investments lead to increasing leptokurtosis of the time-series distribution of prices of the underlying securities. Thus under tranquil market conditions, volatility of prices of these securities is likely to be well-contained, but under turbulent markets such volatility will be exacerbated. If risk analysts apply assessment methods that are based on a normal instead of a leptokurtic data distribution of security prices, they are likely to seriously underestimate risk of investing in volatile securities, particularly at turbulent market times. In hindsight, the wandering asset-price bubble and the over-valuation of various types of securities have made the risk assessment methods that assume a normal data distribution highly inaccurate.
IV. Plausible Theoretical Foundations
The analysis of factors contributing to the current crisis allows for identification of some theoretical underpinnings that explain the special features of this crisis that differentiate it from previous financial crises episodes. A useful conceptual background for this crisis can be found in the following theorems.
1. The standard Keynesian liquidity preference theory. It seems that the important role played in this crisis by CDOs and other complex structured financial vehicles engenders extension of the liquidity preference theory of investments from its traditional reference to the term structure of the bond yield curve and the tradeoffs between bonds and stocks into the liquidity advantage of these new securities in relation to 'plain-vanilla' securities 11 . These new complex securities have emerged on the scale that has not been witnessed before.
Asymmetric information and mispricing of risk.
A distinctive feature of this crisis is the disproportionate asymmetric information facing investors' decisions. 
V. Transmission of Risks and Repercussions of the Credit Squeeze
The wandering asset-price bubble has generated serious distortions or dislocations in interest rates or effective yields among various money and capital market instruments.
Prior to the August 2007 outbreak of the crisis, the fed funds and other short-term interest rates were rising faster then long-term rates (Figure 3 ), leading to the flattening of the U.S. Treasury yield curve. At the same time, the yields on CDOs were above the U.S. Government bond yields. With the progression of the crisis, the term spread on U.S. treasuries has widened, wiping out risk premiums on CDOs.
These changeable movements have contributed to misalignments in pricing of various types of mortgage loans. Since variable mortgage rates normally follow LIBOR or other short-to-medium bond rates, while fixed mortgage rates are priced on the basis on long-term yields, the benchmark linkages in pricing of different types of mortgages have been somewhat broken. This situation has exacerbated the overall credit risk since risk premiums on all securities have generally rose due to their unstable and unpredictable path.
The crisis has also raised volatility of equity securities, thus contributing to propagation of market risk. This can be illustrated by an increase in the market risk An important factor in the proliferation and transmission of risk was the opening of the mortgage financing to nonprime borrowers coupled with the ability of banks to package subprime and Alt-A mortgages into marketable securities. The two step process was applied. First, banks adopted credit-scoring models of borrowers (originally applied in the auto loan market) in order to charge them risk-based interest rates. Second, banks employed structured financial instruments that allowed them to instantly transfer out the default risk associated with nonprime mortgages (DiMartino,
Duca and Rosenblum, 2007).
The securitization of mortgage loans has been applied since 1980s when prime mortgages were being rolled into mortgage-backed securities and sold to other financial institutions/investors. However, securitization of nonprime loans was more complex. It involved slicing the mortgage-backed securities into several tranches according to their risk level and then pooling the appropriate tranches into CDOs. In quintessence, CDOs were originally devised as effective default risk-mitigating instruments. As mortgage originating banks were eager to pass the burden of default onto investors in order to raise cash for new lending, investment banks desired more securitization deals so they had new products to sell. Since selling the below investment-grade CDOs was more problematic, hedge funds, conduits and SIVs were invented.
The severe liquidity crisis sparked by the U.S. housing market slump hurt the formerly-sound but now increasingly-fragile financial institutions as credit risk became elevated by a larger number and variety of under-performing assets. These institutions have become vulnerable to a net drain (net cash outflow) or a potential run on their liabilities, which are symptoms of a higher liquidity risk. In the second half of 2007, they were trying to avert it by either selling off some of their risky assets (to SIVs among others), by borrowing from other financial institutions, or by raising more capital. Those with a vast exposure to CDOs found this task increasingly difficult. The liquidity indexes of the majority of banks were reduced by decreasing values of CDOs; the banks with the largest exposure to mortgage-backed securities were hurt the most. The explicit manifestations of the escalating liquidity risk were runs, i.e. massive liability withdrawals, on Northern Rock in the United Kingdom (Mizen, 2008) liquidity, credit and default risks, and it has been accompanied by a freeze of credit and commercial paper markets. A significant proliferation of counterparty risk (Figures 6a and 6b ) accompanied all stages. In all, this crisis induced by heterogeneous factors seems to reverberate across various risk categories, which makes identifying and mitigating specific risk it particularly difficult. However, this reasoning might be over-simplified and it needs to be tested thoroughly once more complete information and data become available.
In all, the scope of proliferation of various types of risk, as well as their causal interactions have been almost impossible to ascertain and even more so to predict.
Under such mayhem, effective management of financial risk has been seriously impaired. This has posed a challenge for banks to rework their risk assessment models and management practices.
VI. Challenges for Banks
The difficulties of banks to manage various classes of risk during the ongoing financial crisis have renewed debates over a most resilient model of banking. It seems that a universal banking model is emerging as a winner. As discussed in Section IV, universal banks are those offering a wide range of commercial and investment lending activities; their balance sheets encompass diverse earnings streams and they raise funds in both wholesale and retail markets. The crisis has proven a necessity for banks to diversify their balance sheets. The crisis hit the investment banks first, as they had operated with highly concentrated, over-leveraged balance sheets and had to rely only on wholesale markets for funding, i.e. they could not accept retail deposits. Prior to the crisis, they enjoyed extraordinary profits from asset Table 1. ….. insert Table 1 around here …..
The data in Table 1 show that holdings of Level 3 assets are greater among the investment banks than at J.P.Morgan/Chase -a universal bank. Their growth between 3 rd quarter of 2007 and 1 st quarter of 2008 was most pronounced at banks that were 16 As the housing prices decline so does the values of a mortgage which results in higher debt-to-equity ratios of a borrower. When this ratio exceeds unity, the mortgage borrower faces a negative equity situation, i.e. the nominal value of his mortgage exceeds the underlying property value. This makes mortgage uncovered, which negatively affects marketability of its derivative security.
17 According to FAS 157, Level 1 assets have observable market prices, thus can be marked-to-market.
Level 2 are assets that are not marketable are marked-to-model with observable inputs (for instance, interest rate swaps, which components are linked to observable yields on Treasuries). Level 3 are nonmarketable assets that are marked-to-model with unobservable inputs. Their valuation is based on arbitrary management assumptions. In addition to mortgage-related assets, Level 3 category may include also other securities backed by credit card receivables, loans linked to leverage buyouts as well as asset-backed commercial paper.
either unable (Bear Stearns) or unwilling (Merrill Lynch) to raise capital. As indicated above, their proliferation arises mainly from declining home values and uncovered position of mortgage-backed securities. Presumably, re-classification of assets into Level 3 might raise the prospects of a bailout. By the same token, any future return of toxic assets to Level 1 category may have a positive effect on the executive bonus situation. In any case, re-classification of assets into Level 3 category decreases banks' transparency.
In addition to non-marketability of assets, the difficulties of mark-to-market valuation stem from the elevated volatility of asset prices in response to the higher market risk. Under such conditions, losses from riskier assets are amplified, which triggers a perpetual, self-reinforcing spiral of unwinding investments and a further downfall of asset prices.
If assets fall into the Level 3 category and markets remain continuously volatile, management assumptions and algorithms for their valuation are imperiled.
The widely-used method of value-at-risk (VaR) does not really take into consideration leptokurtosis, or prevalence of long-tailed distribution of risk at turbulent times.
Hence the amplifying effect of VaR, as periods of high volatility lift up VaR sending a signal to sell, which in turn further exacerbates volatility.
Perhaps the most serious amplifier of gains and losses is the excessive leverage. In general terms, a sharp decline in asset values cuts deep into equity and entails margin calls from lenders. This reaction prevails regardless of the source of high leverage, i.e. excessive liquidity, high debt, or elevated exposure to CDOs -all of which posing serious problems during the current financial crisis Excessive liquidity arises when banks use short-term borrowings (mainly through SIVs) and invest in higher-yielding long-term assets. Such credit creation took place prior to the outbreak of the crisis when asset prices were rising, helping banks to leverage additional borrowings. The vast exposure to CDOs is also a serious amplifier of losses, since their escalation can be caused by only a small decline in the value of their underlying assets (Craig, 2008) .
The current crisis has been in fact accompanied by a swelling leverage, as shown in Table 2 . The asset-to-equity ratios for investment banks increased sharply between during the 2005-2007 period. The (now-gone) Bear Stearns as well as
Morgan Stanley have reached the highest ratios, while Goldman Sachs has scored its lowest, most comfortable level 18 . In all, such high leverage functions as a dangerous amplifier of losses during the period of declining asset prices and higher market risk, which makes de-leveraging an urgent task for the bankers at the present time.
….. insert Table 2 proven that too many of these scenarios may be implausible under turbulent market conditions. It seems also that most banks may stick to 'plain-vanilla' debt securities, at least until more compelling methods of risk assessment for complex structured products are developed.
The above discussed selected, but presumably crucial dilemmas facing banks in light of the current financial crisis will likely lead to major adjustments in the banking sector. Specifically, since the universal banking model has proven to be more resilient, one may expect a new wave of consolidation within the financial sector. Some of Level 3 assets may eventually become marketable again.
Nevertheless, the collapse of CDOs and some of the more esoteric derivatives seems to be permanent as investors have probably learned their lessons about the de facto risks embedded in these complex securities. One may also hope for a better transparency of balance sheets of banks as the practice of transferring out risk by employing conduits and SIVs has vanished.
VII. Regulatory and Monetary Policy Responses -A Critical Evaluation
Valuable suggestions have emerged from the current financial crisis for regulators and policy-makers. It seems that the regulatory focus should be on restraining structured financing such as conduits or SIVs. Any off balance sheet financing should be subject of rigorous regulatory and supervisory scrutiny in terms of their minimum capital holdings and transparency (Schiller, 2008) .
Even more important lesson for the regulators is the recognition of close linkages and inseparability between different types of risk. Credit-, default-, interest rate-, liquidity-, exchange rate-and counterparty risks are all integrated. Again, a more comprehensive, holistic institutional approach to risk should be promoted by regulators and required from supervised financial institutions. The crisis has shown that the models of dissecting risk into various classes in an attempt to transfer it to market investors were easier to devise in theory than to implement in practice, as they have not always adequately captured all de facto risks embedded in such process. A further, more integrated approach to modeling risk is crucial for advancing financial research.
The crisis seems also to underpin the importance of further elaboration and specification of capital adequacy standards. In terms of Basel II guidelines, it seems important to stick to the discipline of Pillar 1 (minimum capital requirements), while at the same time to expand the scope of both Pillar 2 (the supervisory review process)
and Pillar 3 (enhanced disclosure). Within Pillar 2, it seems imperative to require banks to improve internal procedures for assessing the institutional risk profile and to set up more elaborate guidelines for liquidity risk. The enhanced disclosure practices within Pillar 3 will likely require financial institutions to publish special reports on their financial stability. More work needs to be done also in the areas of developing standardized risk-assessment scorecards for individual credits, particularly mortgages, as well as standardized central clearing contracts on CDS. Along these efforts, it is imperative not to squander CDS as they are crucial for mitigating default risk. The first method may be superior, as it improves capital adequacy of banks (lifting the Tier I capital to risk-weighted asset ratio above the presently-preferred safety margin of 10 percent), while giving them an option to devise other methods of dealing with troubled assets. Moreover, the Fed has used a range of actions to ameliorate the current financial problems, including increased quantity of term funds auctioned to banks, temporary lending facility to purchase high-quality asset-backed commercial paper from money market funds, and currency swap lines with other central banks.
Furthermore, the FDIC raised the limit on banks deposits that it guarantees to $250,000 per depositor per bank. European monetary authorities have designated even larger funds to restore financial stability, mainly through bank deposit guarantees and short-term loans to banks. As of mid-October 2008, the rescue packages of the eurozone amount to $1,370 billion and the United Kingdom $680 billion. Although these efforts of global financial authorities provide a temporary relief to troubled financial markets and institutions, they do not constitute a comprehensive, systemic resolution of this crisis. The need for a comprehensive reform of the current system for supervising and regulating financial institutions and markets on a global basis, as advocated by Kaufman (1999) is valid now more then ever.
Government bail-outs shall be exercised with extreme caution and implemented preferably through a fiscal stimulus, not through cash injections by a central bank. Vast liquidity infusions are likely to hamper price stability thus subsequently hurt central bank's credibility. They also may be perceived as implicit guarantees for high-risk operations of banks in the future. As argued above, credit risk at investment banks tends to follow a leptokurtic, long-tailed time distribution. Hence, many banks that are over-leveraged and rely heavily on wholesale funding are experiencing amplified losses. Similarly, their gains are likely to be compounded at better market periods. If these banks are bailed-out at hard times, does it also mean that their profits should be taxed more at good times? Both of these extreme solutions are unwarranted. In principle, there might be some legitimacy in a government wanting to preserve one of the largest institutions in the country's banking system if significant counterparty risk exists.
Once the stability of financial markets is regained (VIX, TED spread and other market and counterparty risk indicators return to historically-stable levels), central banks will be well-advised to direct their tactical efforts toward managing the 'wandering asset-price bubble' so that capital inflows to specific securities will not endanger price stability or hinder economic growth. One shall assume that the bubble is here to stay, it cannot burst with taxes or other restrictions on capital inflows -it is simply too large. A prudent mix of regulations and monetary policy strategies can channel this capital into productive investments without inflationary consequences and harmful effects on real economy 20 .
Further implications for monetary policy include a need to devise a prudent post-crisis strategy. A viable monetary policy option seems to be flexible, forwardlooking inflation targeting. Flexible inflation targeting denotes achieving a mix of inflation and alternative macro-economic policy targets, such as narrowing the output gap, lowering unemployment or stabilizing the exchange rate. The forward-looking or forecast-based approach to inflation targeting allows for smoothing nominal 20 Tong and Wie (2008) show empirically the scope and the transmission of harmful spillover effects of the current crisis into the real economy. These negative effects are transmitted through two channels:
the declining real consumer demand and, more importantly, the liquidity constraint on non-financial firms.
indexation (Svensson, 1999; Woodford, 2007) . It is therefore likely to reduce volatility or risks associated with key policy variables, such as exchange rates, interest rates, or inflation forecasts. Such monetary policy regime is viable for both, highly developed and emerging market economies although some of the latter cannot target domestic inflation forecasts only. For example, the new members of the EU currently converging to the euro, are well advised to target differentials between the domestic and the eurozone inflation forecasts (Orlowski, 2008b) 21 .
A crucial for a successful implementation of inflation targeting is the appropriate choice of the inflation target. It seems prudent for all central banks to specify the target in terms of headline, rather than core inflation. The fourth stage of the current crisis, i.e. capital inflows to commodity futures, has led to the wider gap between headline and core inflation (Orlowski, 2008a) . The wider gap for the U.S. is shown in Figure 8 . Headline inflation seems to be a bigger problem at the present time and it is likely to pass-through onto other measures of inflation in the near future. The At this juncture it is too early to identify all valuable lessons from the current crisis for policy-makers since the crisis has not been resolved. Nevertheless, coordinated efforts and mutual exchanges of views between researchers and practitioners at all types of financial institutions are both urgent and crucial for drawing lessons and devising prudent micro-and macro-level policies. Several lessons can be drawn from this crisis. Chief among them is the claim that this crisis can be explained by a set of carefully chosen fundamentals that can predict its future path. This set should include the current critical level of household debt ( Figure 5 ) that has reached the threshold for extending any further credit.
VIII. Concluding Remarks -General Lessons from the Crisis
Clearly, the default risk of the household sector -the largest contributor to the U.S.
GDP has reached a zenith and has been grossly underestimated.
Another important lesson is that the existing risk assessment methods have proven to be imperfect. This crisis implies that complex credit derivatives, such as CDOs, entail significant asymmetric information. The de facto risks associated with many structured products turned out to be much larger than the estimated risks. There are also lessons for policy-makers and regulators. At this juncture, the U.S. Treasury, the Fed and other central banks seem to be overwhelmingly concerned about managing the supply of credit, paying little attention to the demand for credit.
While the initial version of TARP emphasized urgency of eliminating toxic assets from banks, the first stage of its implementation was based, perhaps correctly, on equity injections. In the meantime, although most of structures financing vehicles have collapsed, hedge funds still need to be regulated since their activities contribute to excessive market volatility. Among important lessons from this crisis is the need to change risk assessment process and methodology by applying a more holistic approach of incorporating interactions between various types of risk.
There are some macroeconomic policy implications as well. Policy-makers will be well-advised to discontinue the present, somewhat un-orderly and unsystematic efforts to recapitalize ailing banks. They need to devise prudent policies to cushion damaging systemic repercussions of the wandering asset-price bubble caused by changeable allocations of global savings. Among other solutions, a forwardlooking or forecast-based inflation targeting in the U.S. accompanied by a policy of stronger dollar are likely to reduce inflationary effects of the current liquidity injections and rising commodity futures prices. In general terms, it would not be prudent for policy-makers to discourage capital inflows. Instead they should focus their regulatory and strategic policy efforts on re-directing the 'wandering asset-price bubble' to pro-growth investments.
The final impact of the current financial crisis on the global real economy still remains to be seen. A further downfall of credit will likely hamper the real economy going forward. 
